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Abstract 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this paper shows that a high-wage economy can paradoxically 
reduce its level of aggregate unemployment by engaging in international trade with a low-wage 
country.  We demonstrate this possibility after introducing a minimum wage into the basic 
specific-factor model (with immobile capital and mobile labor), even though the opposite result 
is known to arise in the longer-run framework of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
model (with both inputs mobile).  Our result provides a cautionary note for public-policy 
discussions that promote trade barriers as a way to reduce unemployment. 
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1. Introduction  
       According to our main result, international trade with a low-wage foreign country may 
paradoxically reduce aggregate unemployment in a high-wage home country.  This result runs 
contrary to the conventional view in public-policy discussions, which typically express fears of a 
trade-induced net increase in joblessness at home. 
       Such fears do have some theoretical support.1  Building on Brecher’s (1974) analysis of 
minimum-wage unemployment in a two-good two-factor model of the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) variety, Davis (1998) considers a “benchmark case” of two identical countries 
with the same factor endowments, production technologies and homothetic preferences.  He then 
imposes a minimum wage at home, and demonstrates that the introduction of world trade will 
necessarily increase (actually double) the level of home unemployment.  Intuitively, its higher 
autarkic wage gives the home country a comparative advantage in the capital-intensive good, 
implying a reduced demand for home labor when trade is allowed to occur.  Since this reduction 
cannot drive the wage below its minimum level, national employment must fall instead. 
       To allow for the opposite possibility, we relax the long-run HOS assumption that both inputs 
are perfectly mobile between industries of each country.  Our shorter-run analysis assumes 
instead that only labor enjoys intersectoral mobility, while each industry has a given amount of 
sector-specific capital that is unable to relocate elsewhere in the economy.   Thus, we use what is 
called the “specific-factor” or “Ricardo-Viner” model of Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1971), 
                                                          
1 As for empirical support, the evidence is inconclusive.  For example, see Feenstra and 
Sasahara’s (2018) response to a number of papers, including Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson 
and Price (2016). 
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respectively. When a minimum wage is imposed at home within this model, a trade-induced 
reduction in unemployment becomes possible, as demonstrated below.2 
       The minimum-wage constraint could be due to a variety of institutional arrangements, such 
as social custom, labor unions or government legislation.  This constraint is convenient for 
present purposes, because it is arguably the simplest mechanism for introducing the possibility of 
unemployment.3 
       Section 2 sets up the basic model, which is analyzed in section 3.  The concluding section 4 
summarizes the paper.             
2.  Model  
       Aside from the minimum wage at home, both countries are perfectly competitive.  In each 
industry of an economy, every firm has the same production function, which is first-degree 
homogeneous and strictly quasi-concave . All consumers within a country have the same 
preferences, described by a homothetic utility function.  
       Technology in the home country is described as follows:                     
                 ( , ) ( / ,1) ( ), 1,2i ii i i i i i i i iX F K L L F K L L f k i= =  = ,                (1) 
                                                          
2 For effects of international trade on minimum-wage unemployment in a hybrid of the HOS and 
specific-factor models, see Batra and Beladi (1998) who assume two mobile factors and a third 
input that is confined to a single industry.  However, under their small-country assumption, the 
foreign economy is represented only by a fixed set of product prices, in which case it is not 
possible to make our key distinction between high- and low-wage countries.  
3 For other such mechanisms, see Davidson and Matusz (2004, chap. 3). 
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where iX  is the output of good i; iK  denotes the input of  (sector-specific) capital in industry i;  
iL  represents the amount of (mobile) labor employed in this industry; and /i i ik K L .  Since 
each production function 
iF  exhibits constant returns to scale, with marginal products that are 
positive but diminishing, ( ) ( ) / 0 ( ) ( ) /i i i i i i i i i if k df k dk f k df k dk      . 
       Because the rate of return to capital in each sector is perfectly flexible, 
                 i iK K= , i = 1, 2,                                                                                                             (2) 
where iK   stands for the fixed endowment of this factor in industry i.  On the other hand, since a 
minimum wage may (if high enough) lead to unemployment, 
                 L L , (3) 
where L and L  are labor’s total employment ( 1 2L L+ ) and fixed endowment, respectively. 
      Assuming that firms maximize profits, we have the usual marginal-productivity conditions, as 
follows: 
                 ( , ) / ( ), 1,2ii i i i i ir F K L K f k i=   = = ,                                                         (4) 
                 ( , ) / ( ) ( ), 1,2ii i i i i i i i iw F K L L f k k f k i=   = − = ,       (5)                  
where ir  represents the real rental rate of capital in industry i; and iw  denotes labor’s real wage 
rate in terms of good i.  Given that labor is perfectly mobile between sectors, 
                 1 2pw w= ,       (6) 
where p is the relative price of the first good in terms of the second. 
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3.  Analysis  
       In Figure 1, before imposition of a minimum wage, the home economy produces along the 
full-employment production-possibility frontier AB, drawn for 1K  and 2K  units of capital plus 
L  units of labor.  Where this frontier is tangent to a community indifference curve at point C, 
equilibrium occurs when the country is in autarky; and p  (equal to minus the slope of the 
tangent at this point) is the autarkic value of p. 
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       Now impose a minimum wage, assumed to be the same for all workers, regardless of where 
they are employed.  Suppose that this minimum is specified in units of (say) good 1, at a level of 
1w , which exceeds the initial (autarkic) value of 1w .  (As explained below, if the minimum wage 
were specified instead in terms of the second good, similar results would hold, mutatis 
mutandis.)  Then, if we temporarily hold the product-price ratio constant at its initial level p , 
2w  must rise in the same proportion as 1w , to keep (6) satisfied.  Consequently, both 1L  and 2L  
decrease, given (5) and diminishing marginal productivity.  Thus, both outputs fall to the levels 
associated with (say) point D in Figure 1.  (Although this shows the case in which 2 1/X X  rises, 
the actual direction of change in this ratio is governed by a condition derived below.)  At the 
same time, demand falls to point E, which lies on the p  line through production point D (for a 
balanced budget) and on the dashed ray OC (given the homothetic-preferences assumption). 
       Since point E lies southeast of D, there is an excess demand for good 1 (and excess supply of 
good 2) at the initial price ratio p .  To clear this excess in the absence of international trade, p  
must rise to (say) p  .  With this rise in the relative price of the first good, 1L   remains 
unchanged by (2) and (5), since 1w  is fixed by the minimum wage 1w .  Thus, 1X  is also 
constant, implying that production stays on the dashed vertical line through point D.  Also by (2) 
and (5) in light of (6), 2L  and hence 2X  decrease, thereby lowering 2 1/X X  .  Correspondingly, 
because indifference curves are convex to the origin, 2 1/C C  rises; where iC  represents 
consumer demand for good i (=1, 2).  When p falls from p  to p , we have 2 1 2 1/ /X X C C= , 
with production and consumption coinciding at point F.  At this point of autarkic equilibrium, a 
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community indifference curve (not shown) is tangent to the (undrawn) production-possibility 
frontier for 1K  and 2K  units of capital plus less than L  units of labor.   
       Although the minimum-wage constraint is specified in terms of good 1, imposing this 
constraint raises the autarkic value of not only 1w  (by assumption) but also 2w  in the case 
depicted by Figure 1, as the autarkic p  increases (from p  to p ) in (6).4  Thus, the minimum 
wage raises the utility of each employed worker, while reducing national welfare below the level 
represented by the community indifference curve through point C, as the equilibrium shifts to 
point F. 
       Now introduce a foreign country, which has a perfectly flexible wage and hence full 
employment, but is otherwise identical to the home country.  The foreign country is thus in 
autarkic equilibrium at point C.  Therefore, before the introduction of international trade, the 
relative price of good 1 is higher at home than abroad, since p p .  This difference indicates 
that the foreign and home countries have a comparative advantage in the first and second goods, 
respectively. 
       When free trade is allowed to occur, each country will export (import) its good of 
comparative advantage (disadvantage), and the world’s product-price ratio will reach an 
                                                          
4 If point D were below the (dashed) ray OC, implying that p p , we could still show (by a 
somewhat more elaborate proof) that the minimum wage increases both 1w  and 2w .  In both 
cases, since 1w  and 2w  do not move in opposite directions when the product-price ratio changes, 
our minimum-wage version of the specific-factor model does not exhibit what Ruffin and Jones 
(1977) call the “neoclassical ambiguity” in the original (flexible-wage) version of this model. 
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equilibrium value that lies strictly between p  and p .  Thus, when free trade replaces autarky, p 
falls (rises) in the home (foreign) country. 
       This fall in p at home leaves 1L  ( 1 1/K k ) unchanged, since the minimum wage (specified 
in terms of the first good) fixes the capital/labor ratio in sector 1, via (5).  At the same time, the 
home value of 2L  rises, by (5) and (6).  Thus, the home country experiences a rise in total 
employment ( 1 2L L+ ) when free trade is introduced. 
       To derive the necessary and sufficient condition for the case depicted in Figure 1, recall that 
this case arises if and only if imposition of the minimum wage raises 2 1/X X  when the product-
price ratio is held constant at p .  A rise in this output ratio requires that the (negative) elasticity 
of iX  with respect to iw  be greater (in algebraic value) for the second good than the first.  
(Because the product-price ratio is being held constant for this procedure, recall that 2w  
undergoes the same proportionate change as 1w .)  In other words, we need to have 2 1e e , 
where ( / ) /i i i i ie dX dw w X  (< 0) for i = 1,2.  If this elasticity condition is satisfied, the 
introduction of free trade raises total employment of the high-wage economy (with the minimum 
wage). 
       It is straightforward to verify that  
                  i i ie  = − , i = 1, 2,  (7) 
where [ / ( / )]( / ) /i i i i i i idk d w r w r k  , which denotes the elasticity of technical substitution in 
industry i; and /i i i i iw L r K  , which is the ratio of labor’s income to capital’s income in this  
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industry.5  Thus, we have the following result. 
Proposition 1:  When free trade is introduced, the high-wage (home) country will have a rise or 
fall in total employment (via a fall or rise in unemployment) if and only if 1 1   

 2 2  ,  
respectively.  
       If the minimum wage were re-specified in terms of the second good (rather than the first), 
the inequalities in Proposition 1 would simply be reversed.  Thus, by continuity, such a reversal 
could also occur if the minimum wage were specified instead in terms of a bundle of both goods, 
provided that good 1 (2) has a sufficiently small (large) weight in this bundle.6 
       Even though trade can thus lead to more jobs, it cannot achieve full employment along the 
production-possibility frontier AB in Figure 1, according to the following argument by 
contradiction.  With both countries operating on this frontier at the free-trade product-price ratio, 
                                                          
5 First use (1), (2) and (5) to obtain ( / ) / ( / )( / ) /i i i i i i i i i i ie dX dw w X dX dL dL dw w X =   
 
2 2 2( / ) / /i i i i i i i i i iw L k f w X w k f f
 = = .  Next use (4) and (5) to get [ / ( / )]( / ) /i i i i i i idk d w r w r k   
 
1[ ( / ) / ] ( / ) / ( / ) /i i i i i i i i i i id w r dk w r k w k r f f
− = = − .  Substituting this second result into the first  
 
yields (7). 
  
6 More formally, suppose that a (binding) minimum-wage constraint requires the nominal wage 
to equal 1 1 2 2p b p b+ , so that a worker can (just barely) afford to buy a bundle containing 1b  units 
of good 1 and 2b  units of good 2.  (If 1 0b =  or 2 0b = , the minimum wage is effectively 
specified in terms of the second or first good, respectively.)   A reversal of the inequalities in 
Proposition 1 would occur if 1b  is small enough (and/or 2b  is sufficiently large). 
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which  exceeds p  (as noted above), each country would have an (equal) excess supply of the 
first good—thereby contradicting the premise that the world is in free-trade equilibrium.7 
       Note that the home (foreign) country has a relatively high (low) wage not only in autarky but 
also under free trade.  This result follows immediately from the above argument that a reduction 
in total employment at constant product prices raises 1w  and 2w  in the same proportion.  Thus, 
the home and foreign countries remain the high- and low-wage ones, respectively, throughout the 
analysis. 
4.  Conclusion 
       Contrary to conventional wisdom, our analysis shows that international trade with a low-
wage country can paradoxically reduce the level of aggregate unemployment in a high-wage 
economy.  We demonstrate this possibility after adding a minimum-wage constraint to the basic 
specific-factor model, even though the opposite result is known to arise in the longer-run 
framework of the standard HOS model.  Our result provides a cautionary note for public-policy 
discussions about the unemployment effects of trade barriers, especially from a shorter-run 
perspective. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 In this equilibrium, home production must actually lie on the dashed vertical line 
(corresponding to 1w ), at some point above F and below D (since p p p  ). 
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